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Monthly Archives: June 2012
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 8
Logical thinking should determine the size our arsenal. Yet, as we will see below, that number has been determined in a highly irrational manner which “frightened the devil” out of President Eisenhower and continues to be applied today. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged arms control, arms race, critical thinking, deterrence, Gen. James Cartwright, George Kistiakowsky, Global Zero, Hellman, martin hellman, New START, nuclear, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear posture, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower, stanford
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How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 7
Military officers are trained to fight wars, while the only rational use for nuclear weapons would be to prevent war. Putting nuclear weapons under the command of military officers therefore introduces the risk that logic which applies to conventional weapons will be misapplied to nuclear weapons. General Thomas Power, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1957 to 1964 appears to have committed exactly that error. Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 6
Drug or alcohol abuse is another potential source of irrationality in nuclear deterrence. This problem has affected a number of top nuclear decision makers, including JFK, Richard Nixon, Boris Yeltsin, and Tony Blair. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged alcohol abuse, amphetamines, boris yeltsin, deterrence, drug abuse, Hellman, henry kissinger, jfk, JFK amphetamine use, john kennedy, martin hellman, max jacobson, miracle max, nixon's drinking, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, richard nixon
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How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 5
The last two installments in this series dealt with President Nixon’s deliberate, conscious incorporation of irrationality into nuclear deterrence. This installment deals with an unintended risk: Nixon’s suicidal ideation in the final months of his presidency, as Watergate pulled him down. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged alexander haig, critical thinking, david eisenhower, deterrence, edward cox, Hellman, martin hellman, nuclear, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear posture, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, richard nixon, stanford, suicide, war and peace
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How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 4
The previous installment in this series quoted President Nixon as advocating “unpredictable, even rash” presidential behavior in order to “win another hand” at nuclear poker. He employed exactly that approach during his first year in office in what has become known as the “Madman Nuclear Alert.” Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 3
President Nixon believed that irrationality played an important role in nuclear deterrence: “If the adversary feels that you are unpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred from pressing you too far. The odds that he will fold will increase and the unpredictable president will win another hand.” [1] As with the first two parts in this series, this thinking overlooks what happens if both sides succumb to such thinking.
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How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 2
Deterrence’s demand for irrationality is spelled out clearly in a 1995 USSTRATCOM report, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence”: Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the US may do to an adversary if the acts we … Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 1
The logical inconsistency – and danger – of nuclear deterrence should be obvious, but it still is the foundation for national security strategy. For nuclear deterrence to work: Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged critical thinking, martin hellman, nuclear deterrence, nuclear risk, nuclear weapons
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An Incredible Credible Deterrent
Much is made of the need for our nuclear deterrent to be credible. Otherwise, it would be useless. An exchange on September 16, 1980, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has much to say about that quest: Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged cold war, Harold Brown, John Glenn, martin hellman, nuclear deterrence, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, PD59, stanford
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Censorship in Russia?
The American mainstream media tends to give the impression that Russia under Putin is not that different from the good ole USSR. Having visited the Soviet Union a number of times prior to Gorbachev’s reforms and keeping abreast of the Russian press today, I know how false that picture is. Before censorship was lifted, the only honest political discussions I could have with my Russian friends was when no other Russians were present, and we were out of range of any possible, hidden microphones (e.g., in my hotel room). Compare that to an article in yesterday’s Moscow Times, which reads in part: Continue reading
Defusing the Nuclear Threat 