Navigation
-
Recent Posts
Archives
- October 2022
- September 2022
- August 2022
- July 2022
- June 2019
- November 2017
- August 2017
- July 2017
- June 2017
- April 2017
- January 2017
- September 2016
- June 2016
- May 2016
- April 2016
- March 2016
- January 2016
- December 2015
- November 2015
- July 2015
- June 2015
- May 2015
- April 2015
- March 2015
- February 2015
- January 2015
- December 2014
- November 2014
- August 2014
- July 2014
- June 2014
- May 2014
- April 2014
- March 2014
- February 2014
- November 2013
- October 2013
- August 2013
- May 2013
- April 2013
- March 2013
- February 2013
- January 2013
- December 2012
- November 2012
- October 2012
- September 2012
- June 2012
- May 2012
- April 2012
- March 2012
- February 2012
- January 2012
- December 2011
- November 2011
- October 2011
- September 2011
- August 2011
- July 2011
- June 2011
- May 2011
- April 2011
- March 2011
- February 2011
- December 2010
- November 2010
- October 2010
- September 2010
- August 2010
- July 2010
- June 2010
- May 2010
- April 2010
- March 2010
- February 2010
- January 2010
- December 2009
- October 2009
- September 2009
- August 2009
- July 2009
- June 2009
- May 2009
- April 2009
- March 2009
- November 2008
- October 2008
- September 2008
- August 2008
- July 2008
Tag Archives: deterrence
Saber Rattling Works, But Which Way?
We hear repeated assurances that appearing strong and belligerent will get our adversaries to back down and behave. A 1995 USSTRACOM report even argued that we should cultivate a national persona that is “irrational and vindictive” in order to induce fear in our opponents. But … Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged critical thinking, deterrence, martin hellman, nuclear risk, stanford, ukraine, war and peace
2 Comments
Secretary of Defense Admits Perfection is Required
Yesterday, in a speech to STRATCOM, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said: “Perfection must be the standard for our nuclear forces. … there is no room for error. … Americans trust you with their security, their families, and their future.” Unfortunately, saying that perfection is required, does not mean perfection is achieved: “to err is human.” So why are we relying on nuclear deterrence when just one mistake could destroy our homeland, and us along with it?
Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged critical thinking, deterrence, martin hellman, nuclear deterrence, stanford
Leave a comment
Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 6: North Korea
Over the last few months, North Korea has severely tested the world’s patience. It conducted its third nuclear test, canceled the armistice ending the Korean War, threatened the US with nuclear ruin, warned foreigners to leave the country because war was imminent, cut its hotline with South Korea, and readied a missile for firing. This shrill, irrational behavior seems to confirm the conventional wisdom that North Korea is a rogue nation, run by a nut job – end of story. In that perspective, there is little we can do other than hope that our military power deters them from following through on their hair-brained threats. While there is truth in that perspective, it pays to examine some other hypotheses which, if true, would give us more effective options for reducing the risk of a needless war. Continue reading
Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 4: Nixon’s Madman Nuclear Alert
The first three installments in this series of posts drew on irrefutable evidence – formerly classified top secret documents and a recording of a presidential phone call – to show that the public needs to critically question government claims before going to war. Those posts showed that the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, which became the legal basis for the Vietnam War via Congress’ Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, were incorrectly portrayed by the Johnson Administration as unprovoked North Vietnamese aggression. The second incident never happened and the first incident was, in the words of CIA Director John McCone, a defensive reaction “to our attacks on their off-shore islands.” While the loss of over 58,000 Americans and approximately 2,000,000 Vietnamese is reason enough to avoid future such mistakes, the Vietnam War also added little-known nuclear risks. This post deals with the most bizarre of these, an event that has been dubbed Nixon’s “Madman Nuclear Alert.” In a 2003 paper, Stanford Prof. Scott Sagan and University of Wisconsin Prof. Jeremi Suri describe the origins and trajectory of this dangerous ploy: Continue reading
US Unwittingly Encouraging North Korea’s Nuclear Program
While encouraging nuclear proliferation is one of the last things we want to do, we couldn’t be doing a better job if we tried. Every time we engage in regime change, we give would-be proliferators one more reason to seek nuclear weapons of their own. What other way do they have of deterring our much more powerful military from toppling them at some future date? Continue reading
Does Nuclear Deterrence Deter?
A few years ago, my wife pointed out that whoever coined the term nuclear deterrence was a marketing genius: it implies that threatening to destroy the world will deter behavior we don’t like. But what happens if nuclear deterrence morphs … Continue reading
Are We Encouraging a Japanese Nuclear Weapons Program?
One of the last things we should do is empower those in Japan who would like to develop their own nuclear weapons. Yet, we are doing that because we have not thought through the long term consequences of our actions. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged china, critical thinking, deterrence, Diaoyu, international relations, japan, martin hellman, nuclear deterrence, nuclear posture, nuclear proliferation, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, Senkaku, Shintaro Ishihara, Shinzo Abe, stanford, war and peace
1 Comment
Poking the Russian Bear, An Update
As noted in my November 25 posting, “Poking the Russian Bear — Again,” the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has been a needless, major irritant in Russian-American relations for decades, but also became an economic burden to America when Russia acceded to the World Trade Organization this summer. Rather than just repeal Jackson-Vanik as an outdated relic of the Cold War, both houses of Congress have now merged that action with passage of the so-called Magnitsky Bill – trading one poke in Russia’s eye for another. Continue reading
Poking the Russian Bear – Again
There have been some important new developments on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which has an impact on nuclear risk. Most Americans don’t even know that this 1974 relic of the Cold War even exists, but it is frequently cited in the … Continue reading
War Games and Nuclear Risk
One way to apply risk analysis to a potential failure of nuclear deterrence is to decompose a catastrophic failure into four steps and estimate the risk of each step: Continue reading