Navigation
-
Recent Posts
Archives
- May 2013
- April 2013
- March 2013
- February 2013
- January 2013
- December 2012
- November 2012
- October 2012
- September 2012
- June 2012
- May 2012
- April 2012
- March 2012
- February 2012
- January 2012
- December 2011
- November 2011
- October 2011
- September 2011
- August 2011
- July 2011
- June 2011
- May 2011
- April 2011
- March 2011
- February 2011
- December 2010
- November 2010
- October 2010
- September 2010
- August 2010
- July 2010
- June 2010
- May 2010
- April 2010
- March 2010
- February 2010
- January 2010
- December 2009
- October 2009
- September 2009
- August 2009
- July 2009
- June 2009
- May 2009
- April 2009
- March 2009
- November 2008
- October 2008
- September 2008
- August 2008
- July 2008
Tag Archives: Hellman
Poking the Russian Bear and Baiting the Chinese Dragon
In my seminar on “Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Hope,” I emphasize the need for paying attention to early warning signs before a disaster involving nuclear weapons occurs. For example, in one of my course handouts, I identify six key steps that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and demonstrate how, by July 2008, we had repeated five and a half of those mistakes. Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 8
Logical thinking should determine the size our arsenal. Yet, as we will see below, that number has been determined in a highly irrational manner which “frightened the devil” out of President Eisenhower and continues to be applied today. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged arms control, arms race, critical thinking, deterrence, Gen. James Cartwright, George Kistiakowsky, Global Zero, Hellman, martin hellman, New START, nuclear, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear posture, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower, stanford
Leave a comment
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 7
Military officers are trained to fight wars, while the only rational use for nuclear weapons would be to prevent war. Putting nuclear weapons under the command of military officers therefore introduces the risk that logic which applies to conventional weapons will be misapplied to nuclear weapons. General Thomas Power, Command-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1957 to 1964 appears to have committed exactly that error. Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 6
Drug or alcohol abuse is another potential source of irrationality in nuclear deterrence. This problem has affected a number of top nuclear decision makers, including JFK, Richard Nixon, Boris Yeltsin, and Tony Blair. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged alcohol abuse, amphetamines, boris yeltsin, deterrence, drug abuse, Hellman, henry kissinger, jfk, JFK amphetamine use, john kennedy, martin hellman, max jacobson, miracle max, nixon's drinking, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, richard nixon
Leave a comment
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 5
The last two installments in this series dealt with President Nixon’s deliberate, conscious incorporation of irrationality into nuclear deterrence. This installment deals with an unintended risk: Nixon’s suicidal ideation in the final months of his presidency, as Watergate pulled him down. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged alexander haig, critical thinking, david eisenhower, deterrence, edward cox, Hellman, martin hellman, nuclear, nuclear deterrence, nuclear illogic, nuclear logic, nuclear posture, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, richard nixon, stanford, suicide, war and peace
Leave a comment
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 4
The previous installment in this series quoted President Nixon as advocating “unpredictable, even rash” presidential behavior in order to “win another hand” at nuclear poker. He employed exactly that approach during his first year in office in what has become known as the “Madman Nuclear Alert.” Continue reading
How Logical is Nuclear Deterrence? Part 3
President Nixon believed that irrationality played an important role in nuclear deterrence: “If the adversary feels that you are unpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred from pressing you too far. The odds that he will fold will increase and the unpredictable president will win another hand.” [1] As with the first two parts in this series, this thinking overlooks what happens if both sides succumb to such thinking.
Continue reading
The Myth of Nuclear Safety
In memory of the first anniversary of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear meltdown, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged that his government had failed by believing in “a myth of safety” about nuclear power. Before an even worse tragedy befalls us, we need to recognize that society labors under a similarly dangerous myth regarding the safety afforded by nuclear weapons. Political and military leaders, routinely talk of maintaining a safe, secure nuclear arsenal, as if saying that makes it so. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged deterrence, Hellman, martin hellman, nuclear deterrence, nuclear risk, nuclear war, nuclear weapons, stanford
Leave a comment
How Strict is Russian Censorship?
Radio Free Europe’s post about a spoof on Putin shows that, in spite of all the abuse, Russia today is nothing like the pre-perestroika Soviet Union. Continue reading
Posted in Uncategorized
Tagged freedom, freedom of speech, Hellman, putin, russia, spoof, stanford
Leave a comment
Our Nuclear Weapons Are Safe!
Great news. Our Nuclear Weapons Are Safe! At least that’s what the Fiscal Year 2013 Budget of the US Government says on page 104 … Continue reading
